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ABSTRACT
This thesis addresses the gender inequalities produced in pension systems in Latin America,
discusses pension reform, and specifically describes gender inequalities that exist for divorced
women, and the relationship between divorce and pensions. This topic is important in the
discussion in analyzing pension reform in Latin America, as well as analyzing the nuanced
degrees of inequalities present for women in Latin America. It is crucial to understand this
relationship, in order to address gender inequality as divorce rates continue to rise. To analyze
this relationship, I looked at both qualitative and quantitative data. To start I examined the
inequalities present within systems in Latin America. Qualitatively I examined literature on the
history of pension systems and their reforms, as well as examined existing research on
economics and divorce behaviors/rates. Quantitatively I found divorce rates during the times of
reform. From this analysis, I was able to conclude that divorced women are more vulnerable
financially as they age, and that economic policies like pensions have an influential relationship
on divorce behavior. However, I am unable to report a direct correlation between divorce and
pension reform. Nonetheless, this relationship is still important to consider as Latin America
develops. I encourage further research, as pension and divorce provide an interesting topic and
insight on inequalities in Latin America, further research should be made to determine whether a
direct correlation exists, and how specific policy influences women and inequality gaps.
KEYWORDS
Pensions, Latin America, Women, Divorce, Privatization, Reform
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INTRODUCTION:
Before 1981 Latin America pension systems were set up to be state-run. Latin American
economy was still considered to be in the early developing stage and many of the nations were
moving towards a socialist mixed economy, and land reform. Now in 2017, Latin America is
primarily made up of private run pension systems. Most countries are considered in the middle of
development, or developed. Lastly, neoliberal politics are now dominant in many countries, and
many neoliberal policies still remain. One piece of this story that I will be explaining today is the
shift from public to private pensions in Latin America. However, more specifically how these
two different systems impact women.
Between both thoughts of ideology; private funded and public funded, women gain less
pension then men. A gendered impact is a consideration on how something produces, maintains,
or reduces inequalities between men and women. Often when people think of gendered impacts
in Latin America, they think of social or religious normalcies, or they think of policy put into
place by dictators. However, often policies, and programs we don’t necessarily think of as being
disadvantageous to women, produce gender impacts. The Latin American pension policy is one
of these things. Although exact pension policy varies from country to country, it is clear that
these policies have, and continue to produce gender impacts for females. In private funded
systems, there is direct effects on women, due to the way pensions are calculated with woman’s
longevity. However, in public systems inequalities also exist. These often are not directly in the
policy, but the social and cultural environment women are in. For example, often women work
less time than men and this therefore lowers their pension in both a private and public system. I
will be explaining these inequalities in greater depth and their importance.
Because of these inequalities this often means that women are more vulnerable in their
old age, and are financially dependent on those around them. One particular area of interest that I
will focus on is divorce behavior and the intersectionality between pensions. Pensions I argue,
could influence a woman’s decision to be married, or stay married. In this research paper, I will
be examining the reforms of pension programs, and how some of these reforms are directed
towards women’s pensions. From this I will examine the relationship between divorce and
economics, and how the economics of pensions should be considered in this relationship. I argue
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that these relationships are important as Latin America continues to develop and pension systems
continue to reform; some reforming to become more private, while other countries are reforming
their private systems to be more public. These different relationships have an effect on women in
Latin America and old age vulnerability and women’s equality.
Personal Comments and Bias:
I was inspired to write on this topic while leaving in Valparaiso, Chile. A few things
sparked my interest on writing more on this topic. While I spent six months in Valparaiso, and
during that time I lived with a Chilean family. My Chilean family was made up of a single
Chilean women who was 65, her mother who was also a single woman who was 86, and one of
her children, and two of her nieces. There in the house I often heard my “Mama Chilena”
(Chilean mother) describe the financial troubles and stress she was feeling. She had just gone
through an expensive divorce and not gotten as much financial support as she had hoped. She
financially supported her Mother, whom was separated from her husband. During that time in
Chile I was also attending a Chilean University. Often times on my way to school I would see
signs and protests against the private pension system in Chile. Whenever I asked my “Mama
Chilena” what the protests were about she had difficulty describing the intricacies of how private
administrative funds of pensions functioned. Thus, my interest in the relationship between
divorce and pensions had sparked. However, that being said, because I lived in a Chilean family
that was effected by this, I have some bias towards this topic. I recognize that experiencing these
things first hand has given me a bias to believe that these things very much are connected.
Despite this, throughout my thesis I attempt at analyzing this relationship in an objective manner.
History
To understand the different systems that currently exist within Latin America, it is crucial
to understand Latin America’s history and how these systems came to be. Perhaps the most
important country of influence of pension systems was Chile. In 1973 Augusto Pinochet led a
military coup on the white house of Chile, and was president from 1973-1989. The Pinochet
years were crucial years in forming Chilean policy, both in the past, and much of its structure
still today. Under Pinochet, the government began to implement strong neoliberalist policies, one
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of these policies was the privatization of pensions. Which led to a ripple effect throughout Latin
America.
It is important to note that many policy ideas during the Pinochet era, came from US
influence. During the 1950’s the Department of Economics of University of Chicago signed a
contract agreeing to sponsor Chilean students in order to help solve problems of Latin America
development. Throughout the years of 1955-1963, 30 students went to study at the University of
Chicago. The university supported the economic principles of Milton Friedman; an economist
that believed in totally competitive free market economies. Many students began to believe that
these policies could be the solution to Chile’s developmental problems. These “Chicago Boys”
as they are named, became key advisors and many held government positions during the
Pinochet regime. (Silva, 1991). Another important influencer in the movement towards
privatization was the World Bank. The World Bank encouraged the privatization of pension
programs to relieve certain problems that the public pension system created, and to shift the
financial burden from the government to the private sphere. (Paul, 1995) The US and many other
global powers, the Chicago boys, all encouraged neoliberal policy. Although Pinochet came to
power by force and was a brutal dictator, this was often ignored since he was encouraging
neoliberal policy, and Latin Americas economy was improving.
The move from a public PAYG-DB occurred in 1981. This move was a response from
concerns about the public pension system, and the financial burden it created as the population
aged. After Chile changed to a private system, it sparked a debate throughout Latin America, of
which system is the best and pension reform began throughout Latin America.
The decision to spread the idea of private pension schemes within Latin America was not
solely an internal decision. An important part of the history of these changes lays within external
pressures on Latin America. Besides the US whom influenced some of the ideas of economists
that implemented private pension systems, the World Bank was an influencer to spread
privatization of pensions. In 1994 the World Bank published Averting the Old Age Crisis, this
was published after the implementation of the Chilean reform, and praised the reform and
encouraged other Latin America countries to implement a private system in their own countries.
Specifically, it highlighted the FF-DC system as a way to promote efficiency and growth. In
particular countries, the world bank had pension reform missions. In Mexico, and in Argentina,
in which they ran studies on the public pension systems, and created private pension proposals,
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and then got policymakers to back the policy. (Madrid, 2005). The influence of the world bank is
crucial to understand how, and why private pension policy spread so fast throughout Latin
America.

LITERATURE REVIEW:
Pension Systems
Table 1: Public Pension Characteristics
Public Pension System:

Within Latin America, there are two different types

A public pension system used in most of

of pension systems the public- pay as you go

Latin America before 1981

defined benefit also known as PAYG-DB. The

Typically calculated by monthly benefit

PAYG-DB is the basic pension model that most

equal to a percentage of covered

Latin American countries used prior to the Chilean

earnings, times years of contribution,

reform in the 1981. A traditional PAYG-DB system

where earnings are calculated as the

typically sets pension benefits that depends on your

average earnings over a period prior to

earnings and your years of contribution. However,

retirement (for instance, 10 years)

this system was often criticized because often these

⃐ ∗ 𝑌𝐶
PBPAYG-DB = ∝∗ 𝑊

PAYG-DB systems have a weak relationship

∝ the salary replacement rate parameter
⃐ the average covered earnings
𝑊

YC the total years of contribution

between contributions and benefits and the short
vesting period and their rate of return. A vesting
period is a time when no contribution to the pension
is paid due to something like family care,
childbearing etc. The weak relationship between

Gender gaps of pensions in this system
come from retirement ages, gaps in
earnings and other indirect impacts
(Betranou, 2001).

contributions and benefits, meant that many people
viewed pension contributions as a tax versus a
saving, so often evaded it, or inflated it near the end
of their career. The problem with the rate of return
is due to the fact the PAYG-DB doesn’t invest the

money given at the time, but immediately uses it to fund benefits. (Bertranou, 2001). Another
key criticism was the fact that the public system places all the burden on the government, and is
an expensive system to support.
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Table 2: Private Pension Characteristics
The criticisms of the PAYG-DB led to the
Private Pension System

fully funded defined contribution system,

A private pension system ran by private

also known as the FF-DC. The FF-DC is

administrators, and regulated by the

different in the way that it is privately run by

government

pension fund companies. In a FF-DC

People accumulate pension funds until they

pension system, benefits are calculated from

are eligible to withdraw upon retirement age

four factors; accumulation of pension rights,

PB FF-DC=

𝐹
𝐴𝑔

retirement age, type of pension and
longevity. (Fajnzylber, 2010). Current Latin

F= size of pension fund accumulated over
lifetime

American pension programs are built on one

Ag= gender specific annuity, depending on
mortality table

Bolivia, Chile, Dominican Republic, El

Gender inequalities are created by both direct
impacts and indirect impacts

pension system. While other countries like

(Betranou, 2001)

have a mix of the two systems. Finally,

of these two systems. Some countries like
Salvador and Mexico have a pure FF-DC
Colombia, Peru, Uruguay and Costa Rica
countries like, Argentina, Brazil, and Cuba

have continued with a PAYG-DB set pension system. (Arza, 2012). Both of these systems affect
Latin American women differently; however, it can be seen that both systems create gender gaps.
The ways in which pension programs and policy are formed create direct gender impacts
and indirect gender impacts. The direct impacts come from the originating rules and policy set
within the pension system. (Arenas de Mesa & Veronica Montecinos, 1999). Depending on
what the exact policy is, the gaps between men and women’s pensions vary. Although it is
known that direct effects result from gender-mortality tables. A gender specific mortality table is
a table used to calculate pension benefits. The exact equated weight varies depending on country.
Set retirement ages are also considered a direct effect in pension policy. The different
inequalities between men and women’s pensions are created at different points in time. Some are
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created during the accumulation period, or the contribution stage, while others are created in the
withdrawal stage.
Direct Impacts
Mortality Tables
Typically, a PAYG-DB System and a FF-DC system use different mortality tables to
determine pensions. There are different formulas set for estimating pensions, some including life
expectancy. When life expectancy is computed as part of the mortality table it is considered a
gender specific mortality table and automatically a women’s pension will be set lower because
they tend to live longer. Typically, a PAYG-DB system doesn’t have this direct effect because
they use gender-neutral mortality tables. (Alberto Arenas de Mesa and Veronica Montecinos,
1999). But for the FF-DC modeled pensions they use gender specific mortality tables, which has
a direct effect on the pensions given. For example, a man and a woman that retired at the same
age, and had the same accumulation, would receive different pensions. The woman would
receive less in her monthly pension. (Nicholas Barr and Peter Diamond, 2008). This mechanism
of indexation is one way that perhaps with intent, or perhaps without intent the FF-DC
automatically creates a gap between men and women’s pensions. (Camila Arza, 2012).
Retirement Ages
Another direct impact that is seen within both of the pension systems is the set retirement
age. Different countries have different set retirement ages; meaning the age when you are able to
retire and receive pension. This year determines when you are able to access your pension, but
perhaps more importantly determines when you are unable to contribute to your pension. Often
these ages can vary from just a year to five years between men and women. In Chile, the set age
is sixty years, while for men its sixty-five. Although this can seem like a good thing, the ability
for a woman to retire earlier then a man, it ends up having negative effects. The earlier
retirement age means that automatically women have less contribution time than a male.
(Nicholas Barr and Peter Diamond, 2008). Often these two direct effects can compile to make
the gap wider. In a system like Chile, women are affected by the earlier retirement age, and the
mortality table, because both the gender mortality table, and the retirement set age automatically
lower her pension.
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Indirect Impacts
The other effects that drive the gender pension gaps, meaning difference between men
and women’s pensions, are indirect inequalities, or inequalities resulting from the labor market
and society; the unintended disadvantages that women have within the labor market effects their
pensions. Both the PAYG-DB and FF-DC have these indirect gender impacts. Bertranou,
explains that although in theory it seems that the pre-reform systems like PAYG-DB would favor
women because of easier entitlements, in reality it does not because of the differences in labor
conditions between men and women. The largest gender gaps created in pensions are because of
differences in number of years participating in the labor market and wage differences (2001).
Labor Participation Rate
One of the more obvious indirect effects of the both systems is the labor participation rate
of women. Camilla Arza lays out a table of the labor participation of women and describes how
women are less likely to be in the formal labor market, they are more likely to take career breaks
and with each additional child more likely to stay in the informal labor market. In data of urban
areas of Latin America between forty-five to sixty-two women were in the labor market in 2008,
compared to seventy-three to eighty five percent of men. (2012). Depending on the Latin
American country it can be more common for a woman to work within the informal labor sector,
and studies show that countries where more women tend to be in the informal labor sector
creates a larger gender gap, because of the direct correlation between contribution time in the
formal labor market and pension benefit.
Unemployment/Vesting Periods
Another factor that can shorten a woman’s contribution time is unemployment. A study
from 2009 found that women in Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay and Dominican Republic have
higher unemployment rates among women, specifically more than four percentage points then
the rates of men. (Arenas de Mesa A., M.C. Llanes and F. Miranda Bravo. 2006). The longer the
time spent in unemployment the less contribution time towards a pension, so women
experiencing higher rates of unemployment then affects their pension in later years.
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In private pensions a contribution minimum time is set, meaning one must contribute a
certain amount of years to receive a pension. And in public systems benefits are not constricted
to contributions requirements, however, pensions are calculated with the number of contributions
made. Often because of lower participation rates within the labor market, combined with a higher
minimum contribution time, women are unable to qualify. (Arenas de Mesa and Veronica
Montecinos, 1999). The lower contribution the more likely a woman must rely on the minimum
state pension, on family members, or on social assistance.
Factors like labor participation rate, have a big influence on women’s pensions, however
a large part of the lack of participation is due to vesting periods of women. Vesting periods
meaning the time that women take off of work, or leave the work force. Most often these vesting
periods are because of pregnancy, and child care. Multiple studies show that women are more
likely to take these vesting periods then men, and are more likely to take longer vesting periods
then men. Both the PAYG- DB and FF-DC systems benefits depend on contribution time,
therefore without equating these vesting periods of women, the longer a women’s vesting period
the more likely she will be penalized because of a shorter contribution time. (Camilla Arza,
2012). However, in some countries like Argentina they try to balance out their minimum
requirement of a contribution time of thirty years with a childbearing benefit. With each child, a
woman has, Argentina will provide a child benefit on to that women’s pension, in order to equate
for vesting periods due to child caring. (Fabio Bertranou, 2001). However as seen above, because
of other factors like unemployment and staying in the informal sector, child benefits, although
minimize part of the gap cannot equate for the entire gender gap that is created. Additionally,
many countries do not have this childbearing benefit, therefore, have no subsidy for vesting
periods of women.
Wages
Another indirect impact that influences the gender gap is the differences in wages. There
is the problem of lower wages in general for women, but also some of the factors that influence
labor participation of women affects total earnings. Both PAYG-DB and FF-DC systems provide
benefits based on individual pension savings, therefore lower wages during the accumulation
stage has effects on women’s pension benefit. (Camilla Arza, 2012). Estelle James et. al.
describes how during a women’s accumulation period of life, often women are more likely to
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work early in their career, and in the middle or the end of the career are less likely to be in the
work force and be making wages. So, women’s wages are often front loaded, however, pension
systems focus on wages as a whole, or heavily weight wages and contribution made towards the
end of careers. (2008).
Many studies have shown that women on average make less money than men, and
throughout Latin America we can see this to be true, but reasons why this wage difference exists
varies from country to country. Some countries suffer from sexism and have social norms that
women should be paid less. Many social factors and beliefs of the role of women can end up
having serious economic consequences, because although some women choose to stay in the
home, many feel constrained and forced to stay in the home. On the other hand, in more
progressive countries where overt wage discrimination is outlawed the wage difference still
exists.
Education
Lastly, things like education can influence wage inequalities. The amount of job training
and education influences the types of jobs and wages a woman earns. (Nicholas Barr and Peter
Diamond, 2008). Although gender gaps in education have improved, in some nations like
Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru a wide gap between male and female education still exists.
(Suzanne Duryea et al., 2007). Agnes R. And Kelly Hallman suggest that even though many
education gaps between men and women are closing, assets in marriages continue to favor men,
and in some countries like Mexico and Guatemala the difference between asset wealth between
couples is even growing. Meaning that despite a greater equality in certain things like education,
other social and political factors are continuing to influence an economic gap between men and
women (2003).
Widowhood
Camilla Arza argues that the fact that women are more likely to widow indirectly affects
a women’s pension. Married women that spent most of their life in the informal labor sector, or
those that worked in the formal labor sector but made smaller wages, often rely on their
husband’s pensions. The idea of a survivor or widow pension is based on the idea of woman’s
dependency on the male breadwinner. (Camilla Arza, 2008). But as seen before, because often
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Latin America society is still operating in the case of the male being the main provider, a
widower’s pension is important in order to protect widows. Widows pension depends on the
country, but through reform some pensions in Latin America now offer some sort of widow’s
pension, but some countries still rely on the good will of the husband to leave money for his wife
and family. Although often times even with a widow’s pension, women find themselves having
to live at lower costs then when their husband was alive due to different economies of scale. One
study from Casey and Yamada, shows that in a group of nine countries the average women
widowed implied a fall in income from twenty to thirty three percent. (2002). Widows pensions
vary from country to country, often times widowers are forced to give up their own pension in
order to receive their widow pension. In newer reforms, it is seen that often widows benefits
must be purchased, however women can keep their pension as well. (Estelle James et. al. 2008).
Divorce Impact
Lastly an indirect gender impact that has been less studied is divorced women’s pensions.
Although this impact is mentioned in a few studies, the impact of divorce on a woman’s pension
has not been researched in depth, and pensions influence on the decision to divorce is not
considered. This will be the focus of my thesis; the relationship between divorce and women’s
pension. I’m going to be presenting information in order to think about how these two things
could possibly be connected; the other gendered impacts we’ve seen in the literature is important
in this relationship, as it gives us a framework to look at the potential impacts.
Carmen Diana Deere and Cheryl R. Doss argue when studying wealth and assets, many
studies make assumptions on wealth distribution between married couples. Even more so, often
time studies are conducted to demonstrate the household welfare, but not the individual welfare.
However, is this a correct assumption? Can we assume that wealth is distributed evenly between
couples? (2006). In more traditional economies, women spend their life in the informal job
market, however with age they become less productive in the informal market, and they end up
having to rely on what Estelle James et. al. describes as the “accumulated good will” of the
family. (2008). Meaning that their husband or children take care of them financially. My
concern is what happens when these women are left and if “accumulated good will” fails, or if
women divorce their spouse? If a woman is relying on the “accumulated good will” but does not
receive it she becomes vulnerable. Basic minimum pensions can be a type of safety net for

15

women like this, because of this, it’s important to note how basic pensions and pension policy in
general affect women. Furthermore, recognizing how divorced women may be financially
burdened by policy.
I’d argue when we make assumptions that wealth between married couples is equal, we
are also alluding that divorced women face the same financial burdens as male divorcees.
However, we know that these women assume more financial risk and burden from divorce.
(Estelle James et. al. 2008). Fabio Betranou addresses this problem with this idea of “pension
sharing”, or the idea that if a woman is working in the home, while her husband works, because
her work enables him to be go out and work, they should have a shared pension. In places where
pension sharing isn’t legal and divorced women have no rights to pensions after separation,
divorced women face poor prospects. This is concerning due to the fact that there is likely to be
more divorced women in the future, due to higher rates of remarriage among men, and mortality
rates. (2001).
Divorce is a newer cultural phenomenon in Latin America, and that being said relative to
many other countries the divorce rates in Latin America are fairly low. However, I think this an
important topic in the pension gender discussion, because as economies develop, societies will
move towards a higher labor participation rate of women, and higher education levels, closing
some of the gender gaps. On the other hand, as economies develop, the greater longevity of
women and higher divorce rates will maintain the gender gap. (Estelle James et. al. 2008). So as
Latin America policy reform continues throughout Latin America, it is important to consider
divorce in this conversation.
METHODS AND ANALYSIS
In order to evaluate the potential relationship between divorce and pensions I use a
combination of both an analysis of quantitative data and qualitative data. The combination of
these two types of data give a broader picture of the possible relationship between divorce and
pensions. I use qualitative data analysis of literature and research in similar fields, to analyze my
own topic and to give a background and establish current findings in the field. The quantitative
data I use is a combination of data from other sources, as well as forming my own data from
these data sources, and creating a compilation of my own data trends. I look at different data to
give background to the types of pension systems in Latin America, and the various reforms
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throughout time. I then analyze divorce rates through Latin America to show the relationship
over time with pension reform. Through this process I expect to find a positive relationship, and
to encourage more research between this relationship.
Existing Relationship: Economics and Divorce
The first part of my analysis will be to characterize the relationship between economics
and divorce. I will be looking at the literature that exists to explain how certain economic factors
like income and wages can influence divorce and marriage decisions. The literature I choose to
examine is mostly from the US, and focuses on the US, although I do use some research from
other countries. I chose to examine this literature mostly because it was part of the literature out
there in this topic. The research done in the US is much more extensive on this topic, then when I
specifically looked for Latin America, or other countries. Despite this US focus I found that this
literature gave a good background of economics and divorce studies, and connected to my topic.
Some research and literature that will be important in this section is the literature on how
different policy law can influence divorce in different ways. This is important in my topic
because it is research that explains how different political and economic policy effects divorce
rates. Specific literature I’m looking at on policy and divorce is; Stacy Dickert, and Cristian
Meghea examining how social laws influence divorce, from Whittington and Alm examining
how tax law influence divorce, and Alessandra Voena examining how divorce laws effects
divorce. All of these sources are specific to the United States. However, I do use one case form
Sigve Tjotta and Kjell Vage that examines the relationship between public transfers and divorce
in Norway. I will be looking at this literature from both an economic lens, and a socio-political
lens. The economic lens being that I will analyze this literature with economics in mind, relating
how certain economic effects in the literature could be present in Latin America as well. The
socio- political lens, being I will analyze how certain economic effects could influence both
social and political decisions.
Lastly, I will be looking at a specific case in Denmark, written by Anna Amilon on how a
specific pension reform in Denmark effected divorce rates. This case was the only case I was
able to find on how specifically pension reform could influence divorce decisions and
probability. The examination of existing literature of economics and divorce will be the
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foundation of my research because it will establish how economics is influential in divorce
decisions, and how pensions could be viewed as part of this economic factor.
Pension Reform in Latin America
Next, I examine past and current state of Latin America, meaning I will examine the three
different types of pension systems, and the past and current reforms that have been set. The
specific Latin American countries I choose to examine are Chile, Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay,
Costa Rica and Cuba. The decision to choose these countries were because of various reasons.
The main reason being of the limited data that was available on divorce and marriage numbers.
Although some other countries, like Peru, had interesting developments of pension reforms, there
were no years in which I was able to calculate a divorce rate for Peru. Another factor that
determined my choice for countries, was the different pension systems in Latin America, and
there years of reform. I wanted to choose countries with a variety of pension systems; so, the
above countries I have two examples of each different pension system. As well as, choose
countries that experienced some reform in the last thirty years. Although certain countries fit my
wishes more than others, for example Chile was a perfect example of different reform years etc. I
think that these six different countries give a good perspective of the changes in pensions
throughout Latin America.
In order to explain the pension reform, I will explain the historical context of these
reforms, and how the spread of pension reform came to Latin America. After this context, I’ll
explain research from Betranou 2001, to establish the three different types of pension systems. I
will create figures to show where these different systems are in Latin America. I then will
explain from literature and data figures when reforms within Latin America have occurred. I will
give the reforms context by connecting them with previous topics seen in the literature review, as
well as examine the purpose for these reforms. Through each country I will also explain the
current political and social environment towards pensions. Explaining what reforms are
discussed in current politics, and what this reform would mean for that country and for women.
From this analysis readers will be able to see how past systems have evolved with in Latin
America, as well as the connection between all the countries.
Divorce Data Collection
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Lastly using data from the UN, I will create graphs of divorce data. I choose the data
from the UN because it is a reliable source, and one of the only sources available for divorce
rates. I used this data to make my own calculation for divorce rates. From the UN data, I took the
available divorce numbers, and the available marriage numbers, and for the years they matched
would divide divorce over marriage to get a divorce rate. I choose to do my own calculation,
because the divorce rates given by the UN were very limited, and often nonexistent, so I decided
to calculate the divorce rate by taking the number of divorces that year and dividing it over the
number of marriages that year. This was the most consistent rate that was available to me. I
found that my data would be more consistent if I calculated the divorce rate in this way, rather
than using the limited divorce rates given. I also decided to use one source of data from La
Tercera newspaper, in which their source was the Chilean census bureau. I found that as I was
doing my research the divorce rates given in newspapers were often very different than those that
I found from the UN. I decided that this gap was significant enough in the conversation of
divorce data to include one of these sources. However, I choose to only use one data source of
this kind just to demonstrate the data gaps. As well as to describe how potentially a larger
relationship could be seen depending on what data is used. I then plan on using the data that is
available to overlap with the data of pension reform to show the relationship between the two. A
lot of this analysis will be economic analysis, as I will be looking at the economics of pension
policy and divorce rates and breaking it down for readers. I also will be using a political
analytical lens, since I will be analyzing the political implementations of reform, as well as the
social implementations.
Analyzing Trends
The last part of my analysis will be to analyze the trends happening with the data in my
findings. This will be an important part to tie together my thesis. From the literature, to the
figures and graphs, I will tie it all together and analyze the important trends happening. This
sections content will be the final evaluation of the relationship between divorce and pensions.
This also will be the section in my thesis of connecting my topic to the broader ideas and
highlight its importance in research to come. I will analyze on how my findings tie to the idea
that women issues and this issue of pensions and pension reform is an important subject as policy
makers look forward to furthering reforms.
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Limitations
Limitations I am facing in my analysis is a various combination of outlying factors, and
limited data sources. One important limitation in my thesis is all of the other factors that drive
divorce rates. I’m unable to speak to all of the reasons divorce rates can change. However, I will
give one section of my thesis to this important limitation. Another limitation I’m facing is the
limited data sources of divorce rates and pension reform. I will be using the data I have available
and using a combination of literature to try and do my best with this limitation.
FINDINGS
Economic Theory and Divorce Behavior
Table 3: Economic Theory and Divorce Research
Existing Research

Economic Theory

Effect on Marriage/Divorce
behavior

Treatise of Family, Gary

Humans specialize, develop

People marry people with

Becker (1991)

skills and earn a living by

different specialization to

their specialization

increase their material wellbeing

Economic Influences of

Disadvantaged people marry

Disadvantaged people often

Marriage and Divorce, Nancy

and stay in unions for

can’t afford to be single

Burstein (2007)

different reasons then
advantaged

On the Study of Divorce and

As a country develops,

Women with higher

Socioeconomic Status,

women labor participation

socioeconomic status are

Dorothy Smith (1985)

rate increases, and so does

more incentivized to end

her socioeconomic status

unhappy marriages

Tight knit families in

Developed and industrialized

industrialized society do not

societies have higher divorce

have same value as in

rates

Structural Determinants of
the Divorce Rate: A
Cross-Societal Analysis
Katherine Trent, Scott South

unindustrialized society
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It is reasonable that Latin America has a lack of specific research on divorce and
economics, due to the fact that divorce has only been legalized recently for many countries,
Chile (2004), Brazil (1977), and Argentina (1987). Research on economics and divorce is a
newer subject in the field of economics. However, from the research done, it is clear that there is
a strong relationship between economics and divorce decisions, in various different ways. I will
be examining this literature in order to give support to why this topic is of importance, and how
pensions can be thought of as a type of financial asset, that would therefore influence divorce.
One of the first theories of economics and marriage/divorce decisions comes from Gary
Becker, in his Treatise of the Family (1991). Becker explains a standard economic model that
individuals marry in order to increase material well-being. He explains how a marriage
relationship is similar to trade, and specialization. Couples consist of two people with different
specializations. Of course, this cannot equate for all marriages, as we know couples are often not
specialized. But this theory gives a basic foundation of viewing the decision to marry as an
economic specialization. Other economists have found that “disadvantaged individuals”, or
people with fewer opportunities in life, have different effects of why they would stay in a union,
like a lower opportunity for work, or self-insurance against things like unemployment and
sickness, as well as a lower overall material wealth. Or as Burnstein phrases it “the idea that
disadvantaged cannot “afford” to be single” ( Burnstein, 2007). This idea is similar to Beckers, in
the way that it suggests that disadvantaged people tend to stay in married situations, or seek
marriage, and seek someone of different specialization.
Although many critique Beckers theory, the basic idea that marriage and economics is
tied is seen in other studies. For example, various studies have been done on whether income
influences marriage and divorce decisions, and that women and men tend to make different
financial decisions. Income effects have been seen to have a wide range of influence on marriage
and divorce. For example, a higher male earning has been shown to mean a more stable
marriage. (Tzeng, Mare, 1995). In addition to this, it is known that women and men save
differently within a marriage. Women tend to spend more money on their children. Even in
western developed countries, like Canada, women have a lower likelihood of saving and
financial planning. Although the spending on children can equate for some of this, there is a clear
disconnect, and researchers are unsure of why women’s saving continues to lag behind men.
(Shelley, 2006). This difference in saving can be important in the conversation of pensions
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because women’s savings effects women’s pensions. This lag means that even in western
countries women often depend on their husband’s pension in old age. (Gustman and Steinmeier
1999; Sunde´n and Surette 1998; McGarry and Davenport 1997).
Research has also seen that more developed countries tend to have higher divorce rates.
As Latin America develops it important to look at how this development could influence divorce
rates. For example, countries like Australia, Canada, Norway and the United States all are highly
developed countries with some of the highest divorce rates. While countries like Nicaragua,
Honduras and Thailand are less developed and have very low rates of divorce. It has been found
that the more industrialization, or development a country experiences the more likely “family
disruption” will occur. Meaning that the tight knit family isn’t as necessary for daily function as
it was in the past. (Trent, Scott, 1989). One famous researcher within the field of family research,
William Goode, found in his first study in 1969, that modern marriage is unstable because unlike
in the past, marriage being an economic decision, many times people now marry for love. (1969)
Perhaps the most studied is how women’s labor rate effects divorce rates, and this positive
relationship. We can see this positive relationship between women’s status, and divorce.
Expanding on this idea that as a woman becomes more financially independent she is more
incentivized to end unhappy marriages. (Smith, 1985). It’s important to note that not many
research studies have done correlation studies across different countries, and many of this
research is about the United States.
Economic Policy and Divorce Behavior
Table 4: Economic policy and Divorce Research
Existing Research

Economic Policy

Effect on Marriage/Divorce
Behavior

The Effect of Social Security
on Divorce and Remarriage
Behavior
Stacy Dickert, Christian
Meghea (2004).

A change of policy to make

Divorce rates after 9 years of

US social security benefit

marriage increased

Til Death or Taxes Do Us
Part: The Effect of

The US income tax incentives Couples respond to tax

after 10 years of marriage

change couple’s behaviors,

incentives in their decision to
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Income Taxation on Divorce

and vary for men and women

divorce, specifically women

Leslie Whittington, James

clearly respond to tax

Alms ( 1997)

incentives

The effects of a Danish legal
reform on divorce
probabilities and pension
Savings
Anna Amilon (2015)

Danish law was changed to

During the first 7 months of

treat pension weights the

the reform divorce rates in

same.

sample increased .1-.3 %, but
predicted to increase more in
general population

Divorce studies in the world are relatively new, however many studies out there right
now are on the effect of economic policy on divorces. The literature on divorce mostly consists
of influence of legislative decisions on divorce, and the economic incentives for divorce. A
countries divorce rates could vary depending on their policy, and divorce rates have seemed to be
highly influenced by policy. In the US, social security benefits used to be set after twenty years
of marriage, but was moved to benefits being set after ten years. A study found that divorce at
nine years increased from this change of law. (Dickert 2004). Additionally, there are studies that
show that tax incentives influence decisions to divorce. (Whitington, Alm, 1997). In Norway, it
is seen the public transfers increased divorce rates (Tjotta, Vaage, 2006). Depending on the state
in the US divorce allocations are set to community property states (assets divided equally), and
title based states (where assets split to spouse that holds title of property), these differences have
shown effects during marriage, and divorce. It is shown that when assets are equally divided
during marriage, equality of consumption is more likely. The reforms of equal division tend to
have the largest benefit on women with a lower income then their husband. (Voena, 2015). As
can be seen from these studies, the changing laws, and evolvement of laws is an important
element to understand when evaluating divorce rates and patterns.
Money, assets and income all have a role in divorce decisions. In many ways, a pension
is a type of asset, or income. Either way it is seen, pensions are financially important and
influential in lives. So, if we view pensions as a type of income, or asset, of course pension
would also then have a relationship with divorce. Previous literature on pensions, men and
women, one study shows that as a women’s bargaining power increases pension savings
increase. (Brown, 2000). Another study shows that a woman saves closer towards retirement.
(Lundberg,Ward-Batts 2000). A study by Anna Amilon, studies the effect that a recent Danish
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pension reform has on divorce rates and probabilities of divorce. The Danish pension system
could be a considered a mix system because it’s a combination of PAYG-DB, and a FF-DC as
well as individuals private savings. Before the 2007 reform, different pensions were given
different weights in divorce. For example, “if a self-employed individual got divorced from an
employee, the self-employed party would have to share his or her private pension with the
employee, whereas the employee would keep all his or her labor market pension.” However now
with the reform the different types of pensions are given the same weight. Amilon found that in
this reform, in a 7-month period, divorce rates increased by .1-.3%, but with the smaller sample
size, in total she predicted a 12-40 % increase. (2012). This study is an interesting case where we
can see that specific pension policy is directed at divorce, and pension policy effects divorce
rates and probabilities. Although Latin America has a different political and social situation then
Denmark, and its pensions are set up differently, this study illustrates the potential relationship
between pensions and the decision to divorce.
The existing research of economics and divorce establishes a clear relationship that
economic theory, and direct change of economic/political policy has an influence on divorce
behavior. This is crucial to understand the relationship between divorce and pensions. Pensions
are a type of financial asset; therefore, pension policy should be considered an economic policy
that could potentially influence divorce behavior.
Pension Reform in Latin America
I will now begin to characterize the different systems within Latin America. As seen in
my literature review there is three different types of pension systems within Latin America, the
PAYG-DB, the FF-DC, and a mix of these two systems. Current Latin American pension
programs are built on one of these two systems. I will specifically be focusing on Cuba, Mexico,
Costa Rica, Chile, Brazil and Uruguay, because these are the countries with the most extensive
divorce data as well as pension data. Lastly in each country I will describe the political
environment surrounding pensions. Many of these countries may have not experienced reform
lately, however, almost all of these countries have politicians, citizens and sometimes
international communities pressuring for reform. The desire for reform is an important part of
this discussion, because some of the desired reform addresses issues seen in the pensions, while
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other desired reform can ignore some of the problems that exist, and this desire can help predict
future policy.
Figure 1: Pension systems in Latin America
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Table 5: Pension Reform in Latin America
Country

Years of Reform

Summary of reforms

Chile

1981, 2008

1981- privatized pension.
2008- set up a basic solidarity
pension, set up reforms
specifically to address gender

Mexico

1995

Privatization of pension

Brazil

1998

Change of calculation of
pensions

Cuba

1965, 2008

1965- universal pensions
2008- Raised the age of
retirement by 5 years

Costa Rica

2005

Introduced a private pillar in
the pension system

Uruguay

1995, 2008

1995- added a private option,
maintained the public option
2008- changed retirement
age, added subsidy for
women with children

The two countries that have completely private pension programs that I will focus on are
Chile and Mexico. FF-DC or fully funded pension system means that citizens are paying their
contribution into an individual account. These funds are invested and then the returns are added
to the investments. The DC in this case means defined contribution, meaning that there is a set
number of years of contribution, rather than benefits set. (Mesa de Lago 1996). The
government’s role within pensions switched to regulator, vs the infrastructure that provides
pensions.
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As mentioned previously after the reform of 1981, it became clearer that a private
pension program did not solve all of the pension issues. Rather private pension systems still
contain issues similar to that of public, and also created new issues. Some of these issues as
noted earlier are gender inequalities, but also inequalities created between classes in general, as
well as high administrative costs, and no manner to account for unemployment and other gaps in
employment. (Buchholz, 2008). In 2008 Chile had its first major pension reform since 1981, this
reform was meant to equate for some of the problems that were occurring within the pension
system. Under Michelle Bachelet, Chile implemented this reform. Perhaps the biggest
implementation was the basic solidarity pension. Meaning the reform set that a basic pension
must be available to all citizens. This was implemented to ensure that even those who were
unable to, or did not contribute to the system are able to get a pension. To qualify for this type of
pension you must be at least 65 plus, and rank a certain poverty level based on a poverty level
scale. This reform also included a pension top up; meaning that those that did contribute to the
pension system have increased benefit. (Behrman, 2011) This basic set pension is a super
important evolvement because this basic pension creates a pension for many elderly women that
had no contribution, or very little contribution due to things discussed earlier.
However, a key piece of reform in 2008 was reform specifically targeting gender
inequality. Chile is the only country out of the countries that I study that has reform specific to
gender. Chile made four specific targets towards women’s pensions. The first reform was setting
aside a grant for each live, or adopted child. This grant was equal to eighteen months of
minimum wage contribution. This is particularly helpful to women that are inactive in the
contributory system due to childcare. Another reform added was addressing the
survivorship/widow pensions. Before the reform women’s and men’s survivorship was
calculated the same way, despite the mortality table of men and women being different.
However, in the reform the calculation was reformed to calculate men’s and women’s survivor
pension differently, this did not subsidy the age difference, however was simply put to avoid a
cross subsidy from women to men. Chile also implemented a compensation case for divorce and
annulment. This reform meant that a Judge could instruct transfer of pension from one party to
another, if he/she deems necessary for economic compensation. However, its crucial to note that
this is entirely up to the judge, and depending on eligibility for the solidarity pension, a
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compensation pension may not be granted. Listed in Table 6 is the breakdown of the estimated
difference of this. The reform directed at divorced/annulled women, clearly shows that previous
to reform divorced women are a vulnerable group as they age and receive pensions. Arguably
these women can still be considered a vulnerable group, as this reform leaves the pension
splitting to a judge, whom could have biases. (Berstein et al, 2009). However, this reform is the
most direct reform addressing inequalities of pensions for divorced women that is seen in the
countries I have studied.
Table 6: Woman’s pension and duration of marriage

Despite the reform of 2008, it is clear that more reform to the Chilean pension system is still
something desired by the public. On March 27, 2017, 800,000 protestors flooded the streets of
Santiago in protest of the FF-DC pension. The main argument made is that the FF-DC benefits
the richest, and penalizes the poorest. Leaving the poor with less than minimum wage to live off
of. (BBC Mundo, 2017). So, although, Chile initiated reform of its private system, much of the
public is still unhappy.
Similar to Chile, Mexico used to have a complete PAYG-DB system, which was replaced
in 1995. However certain elements of this pension system are originally different then the
Chilean system. The Mexican reform of 1995 immediately set a minimum pension for all
citizens. Mexico’s pension reform was highly influenced by the Chilean model. Mexico had a
PAGY-DB system and then in 1995 developed an FF-DC system. Similar to Chile, Mexico was
experiencing problems with the PAGY-DB system and decided to switch to FF-DC to
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limit/eliminate these problems. However, Mexico’s original FF-DC is different than Chile. For
example, right away in 1995 a minimum pension was set. This minimum pension is based on
consumer price index versus evolution of wages. Since this original reform Mexico has not made
any additional reforms. Additionally, different from Chile, Mexico did not have a dictatorship
when pensions were changed, and so women’s role in workforce is different than in Chile and
was not as discouraged. For example, during this time the labor rate of Chilean women is lower
than that of Mexican women. (World Bank Database). Although Mexico has not experienced
reform, many citizens are worried about the effects of this pension system on their pensions, and
many researchers are arguing that the system is on the verge of a collapse. Mexico is known to
be an aging population, and experts from Organization of Economic Development, the OECD
estimate that Mexicans final pension will be 25-35%, when the recommended amount is 75%.
The OECD has urged Mexico to undergo major change in their pension system. (Carbajal, 2015).
Although most of these worries are specific to the system, and not to gender inequalities, within
Mexico there is an awareness that women, and the poor are disadvantaged, and many worry that
the “safety net” provided by the pension system is not enough. (OECD)
The same year of 1995 when Mexico reformed, Uruguay reformed as well. Uruguay was
also influenced by the Chilean model decided to implement FF-DC. However, Uruguay kept its
PAYG-DB system and added a FF-DC option as well. Robert Palacios, and Edward Whitehouse,
in their paper the Role of Choice in the Transition to a funded Pension system, describe Uruguay
as the most complicated reform, and switch out of any Latin American country. They explain the
reform is the most complicated, because of the mixed system implemented, but also because the
government tried to predict how many would switch to fully funded pensions, and estimated
wrong. This then made it complicated, because the way that they structured the pension and
pension ages etc. was made based off of this assumption. (1998). Uruguay had a long-standing
pension system, which consisted of a PAYG-DB system in which workers had to contribute 30
years and had a minimum retirement of 55 or 60 years old, this system also had disability
pensions. In 1995, the PAYG-DB program was reformed so women and men had the same
retirement age. The contribution age, was then raised from 30 to 35 years, and the FF-DC
pension pillar was added, giving citizens a choice between to different schemes. Then in 2008,
Uruguay reformed again. This reform actually reverted the ages of pensions necessary on the
PAYG-DB side, back to the age previously needed before the reform. Another important change
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they made, was to add on a subsidy for women with children’s pension. It added one more year
of contribution for every child, for women. (Cruces, Bergolo, 2013). Uruguay as we can see is an
interesting case in looking at reform, because it was influenced by the Chilean reform, and the
move towards FF-DC. However, kept the option of a public pension as well. The reform for
women with children, also indicates that Uruguay was aware of the inequality being produced,
and made that reform in order to try to reduce that inequality. This is important for gender
inequalities in pensions, because the women subsidy for women, equates for some of the
inequalities produced in vesting periods.
Similar to Uruguay, Costa Rica moved to a mix system, but it was one of the last
countries to make a reform, as it reformed in 2005. Costa Rica is an interesting case because for
a long time it resisted pressure from other nations, and organizations like the world bank to
privatize its pension program. Even in its reform of 2005, it resisted to make it more radically
private, like the World Bank wanted. Kurt Weyland describes that for Costa Rica we can see this
battle between the technocrats and other officials on the policy of pensions. Ultimately, having
the technocrats succeed, when enacting the FF-DC parallel to their PAYG-DB system. (2005).
Costa Rica’s system consists of four pillars. The first pillar being that of the basic contributory
system, is a set mandatory contribution to organizations run by the government, this is
considered to be part of the public pension pillar of the system. The second pillar is the
supplementary pension, this is an obligatory contribution to a private pension administrator, one
chosen by the worker, the pension is then calculated by these private pension administrators, this
pillar is associated with private pension. The third pillar is the voluntary supplementary pension,
meaning that one can choose to save more with an administrator of their choice. Lastly is the
pillar of the non-contributory pension, meaning extra assistance/pension to those that either are
unable to make the minimum of contribution or were unable to contribute at all. (SUPEN, 2017)
Costa Rica’s mixed system is different than Uruguay because it requires everyone to participate
in both the public and private system. The first two pillars are mandatory to participate in.
Costa Rica is also a different case, because unlike Mexico, and Chile that are shifting
back towards more “public” in the way that they are pushing for reforms for the private system,
Costa Rica is pushing towards more private. Costa Rica, like Mexico, and many other countries
is concerned that its pension system will not support its growing elderly population. Various
reforms are being suggested; to raise the minimum age for retirement/pension benefits, decrease
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pension benefits, or complete privatization. This is an interesting shift, because Costa Rica sees
its aging problem as perhaps being solved by privatization. However, there is an
acknowledgement that many of these suggested reforms aren’t the answer. For example, Edgar
Robles, the ex-superintendent of the pension system in Costa Rica, argues that a more fluid
mixed system is needed, and instead of a multiple pillar system, Costa Rica should move towards
a single pillar system with mixed elements. He argues this is different from what is currently
happening in the country, because currently the public pillar is making risky investments with
the pension fund, and the solidarity pillar is leaving people behind. However, he argues that
moving to a complete private pension would leave the poor behind as well, and would be an
expensive shift. Robles is able to state clearly that a complete private, or a complete public
system does not solve everything, which moving forward is an important concept to consider as
we see different Latin American countries struggles with their pension system. (Robles, 2017).
Lastly both Brazil and Cuba have a PAYG-DB pension system. A PAYG system is one
in which the current generation pays for the older generation and so on. Or as Carmelo MesaLargo describes each generation is in “solidarity” with one another. A DB, means a direct
benefit, meaning that in these public PAYG systems, law sets direct benefits. Brazil and Cuba
are two Latin American countries that have continued to have this public system. (1996).
Unlike many of the countries we’ve seen in Latin America, Brazil decided to maintain its
public pension program. Similar to Costa Rica, Brazil felt the pressure of the international
community, and other Latin American countries to privatize. In the 1990’s the question of
privatizing the pension was a top priority for the government, however when it came to reform,
Brazil made changes to the public pension scheme instead of reforming it completely, due to
various factors. (Weyland, 2005). One of these reasons was that Brazil found it too expensive to
completely change to a private pension scheme. The reform of 1998 sought to change certain
problems the public system was experiencing, and create a new methodology for calculating
benefits. The change to the formula produced a formula more flexible, and adjustable, with goals
in mind to correct distortions made by previous models. This reform also eliminated contribution
scales, and an extended time of calculating contribution benefits. During this time Brazil created
other social programs, and the social security system became responsible for non-pension
benefits. But perhaps the most important difference in the Brazil pension scheme is that it gives
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higher value to civil servant’s pensions. The pensions for civil servants represents about half of
the pension total, and is a main factor in Brazils pension inequities (Bonturi, 2002).
Although Brazils pension system has not experienced much reform, the want for reform
is one of extreme priority for the government. In March 2017, was the deadline for proposals for
amendments of the pension system. In total, 164 amendments were proposed by politicians to
change the pension system in various ways. One of the suggested reforms is to raise retirement
ages, but to have women’s age lower then men’s, as a way to recognize women’s tasks within
the home. (Sputnikmundo, 2017). However, as we’ve seen in the literature, often times
depending on the calculation of pensions, a lower age for women can be disadvantageous, if
mortality tables are used in addition to the lower age. The pension system is under the
constitution in Brazil, and to make these changes it would require a 2/3 vote by congress,
therefore making it hard to change the system. This movement of reform is being led by
President Michel Temer. President Temer has been under trial for corruption two times
throughout this year alone. (Londono, 2017). That being said, Temer’s movements to reform the
pension system have been drastically slowed down due to his unpopularity, and the time
consumption of congress on manners of the corruption charges against him. (Reuters, 2017). So,
although there is a big recognition to move towards pension reform, Brazil continues to wait, and
no set reforms have been made.
While the rest of Latin America was experiencing neoliberal policies, Cuba was in a
closed economy. From the time of the rule of Fidel, Cuba shifted its policies, and began to keep
its focus inward. So, it’s no surprise, that Cuba did not follow the lead of Chile for private
pension. Rather instead, they kept their public pension program. Fidel universalized the Cuban
pension shortly after coming to power in 1963. However, different than Brazil, because the
country is a centrally planned economy, most were employed by the government, tax evasion on
pensions is more difficult. The pension program remained basically the same throughout all of
Castro’s rule. (Perez, 1998). Cuba operated under a strict PAYG-DB pension program for all
citizens, and still does to this day. Cuba has experienced one reform, when in 2008, Raul Castro
raised the age of retirement, by five years. However, Cuba’s population continues to age, and the
pension program continues to be a large expense, despite much of the population living on
minimum pensions. (Mesa-Lago, 2014). Despite this, with the changing politics of Cuba we do
not see a large push for any pension reform.
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Although there is this clear ripple effect of the privatization of pensions. It is clear that
each country experienced this influence and reformed pensions differently. We are able to see
this swing from public to private, however as countries like Mexico and Chile have politicians
and the public pushing towards subsidies and forms of “public” again. While other countries like
Costa Rica and Brazil are experiencing concern of the ageing population are experiencing a push
from politicians and the public to “privatize” or reform the public system. The experience of the
women varies in each situation. As we know from the literature, certain changes of retirement
ages can sometimes increase a pension inequality, if mortality tables are used. Yet some
countries with basic pensions help support women, specifically poor women, and although all of
these countries now have a basic system of support, often times these minimum pensions are not
enough money to sufficiently support the vulnerable. On the other hand, recognition of gaps, and
subsidies for children like in Uruguay and Chile can help close some of these gender gaps.
Although many countries above have not experienced multiple reforms, or gender specific
reforms, it is still important to consider future reforms and the gender effects of these reforms.
Divorce Data Section
In the scheme of history, divorce is a relatively new concept, and a relatively new thing to
measure. In many Latin American countries divorce didn’t become legal until the last few years,
as late as 2004 in Chile. While other countries like Uruguay have had divorce law since 1913.
The UN defines divorce as “a final legal dissolution of marriage, that is, that separation of
husband and wife which confers on the parties the right to remarriage under civil, religious
and/or other provisions, according to the laws of each country” (United Nations, 2001). The data
I gathered is from the UN, from there I gathered divorce numbers, and marriage numbers, and
created the divorce rate by dividing divorced over people married each year. I also included a
double set of data, one from the UN, one from the Chilean Census Bureau, to display the varying
divorce rates depending on data.
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Figure 2: Graph of Divorce Rates in Latin America
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As seen in the Figure B, Latin America overall has an increasing trend of divorce rates, with no
obvious trend with pension reform. We also can see unsurprisingly that the more conservative
nations, like Chile and Mexico tend to have very low rates over time. Chile decreased rates from
2006 from 2008. But the last data available from the UN was in 2008, and so we are unable to
see what the rates were after the 2008 Chilean reform. However, the other Chilean data we see a
large spike in divorce rates from 2007-2009. As you can see depending on what data is gathered
the increase in divorce rate could vary quite drastically. Mexico similarly has steady rates, with a
slight increase over time. Uruguay is by the far the outlier of data. Because I calculated all of the
divorce rates using divorce data over marriage data, meaning the marriages in that particular
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year, because that was what was available to me. This explains why Uruguay was such an
outlier, as it clearly didn’t have high marriage rates those specific years. Uruguay has some of
the highest rates, and there is a large spike from 2002- 2004. Costa Rica experiences higher rates,
but in 2006, the year after the 2005 private pillar of pensions were introduced rates drop slightly,
however after that begin to rise again. Brazil has fairly steady rates with little change, but after
the 2005 reform there is a slight increase in 2006, but overall pretty steady. Lastly, in Cuba there
is a fluctuation of rates, and an increase in 2009 of rates after 2008 when Raul Castro raised age
minimum. Overall we see that over time divorce rates increase in Latin America, but see no
obvious trends.
Analysis of findings
From my findings, I found that the relationship between pension policy and divorce is a
complicated one. Although I was unable to make a correlation between the two things, I think
one can see in my findings that a relationship between the two exist, and although they are
different, the two connect in ways.
In the first section I was able to find a lot of literature connecting economic policy with
divorce rates and/or behavior. The first section just consisted on research on how economic
behavioral theories, and economic development affects divorce rates/behavior. The second
section specifically focusing on how economic policy or divorce laws influence divorce
rates/behavior. This showed me that economics influence divorce. Pension policy is an economic
component of politics; therefore, pension policy also affects divorce. This section I was able to
broaden the conversation of this topic, to then be able to point back to the connection of these
two with stronger evidence.
From there in the section on pension reform, we begin to see how complicated pension
reform and policy becomes. It is more than just private or public, each country was slightly
different, and reformed at different times. Here, we are able to see that the pension systems
contain these inequalities previously mentioned. However, we also are able to see the intricate
differences in these pension systems. The study on current wishes for reform was important
piece of the story, because although many of the countries have yet reformed, it is interesting to
observe how hard pressed many are to change and reform. I think that this push for new reform,
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highlights new issues, like the demographic transition in Latin America. This reform was key to
understand what new and previous reform means for women.
Lastly, I gathered divorce data to illustrate what divorce rates were during the time of
these reforms. There were not any specific trends, besides in all countries the divorce rates
seemed to increase over time. I had expected to find that depending on time of reform, if reform
was directed at woman’s equality we would see an increase in divorce rates, however I did not
find this to be the case. Additionally, it is unknown if the reform would affect divorce rates
immediately or if it would experience a lag for some reason. Despite the divorce data being not
what I had expected, I think that my findings generally describe a different manner to view both
pension systems and divorce behavior.
Limitations
The limitations I had were very specific on finding the data for divorce, as well as for
marriage. The divorce data I found was a wide mix. Most of the data I ended up using was from
the UN, however I did the calculations for divorce rates, because the divorce rates were
unavailable for many countries and for many years. I decided to calculate the divorce rate by
taking the number of divorces that year and dividing it over the number of marriages that year.
This was the most consistent rate that was available to me. However, even with calculated
divorce rates, I was limited by the fact that data was not available for marriage numbers, or for
divorce numbers. This gave me only the divorce rate of certain years.
An important thing to note, is that many newspaper articles from various different
countries had different marriage numbers, and divorce numbers, often these newspaper sources
cited their sources as the national census bureau. This was difficult, because I wanted to keep my
numbers from one source, the UN, but it’s clear there is a discrepancy in the data. In addition to
this, often times the numbers from the news sources were higher. Hence why I had chosen to use
one source to show this discrepancy in the data.
These limitations themselves could be an interesting topic of research. Why is that
divorce rates are so difficult to find? I think there could be various different reasons for this,
however, I think the negative connotation divorce has, could be a potential reason that much data
for divorce is nonexistent in Latin America, but in the world in general. I would argue that
important indicator of a country.
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Another crucial limitation to note is the lack of knowledge on reasons for divorce. Of
course, there can be many reasons a couple decides to divorce. Although some data exists in
certain studies on reasons for divorce, it is impossible to know why each couple decides to
divorce. It is also key to explain that often times it is not one reason, but rather a combination of
various reasons.
CONCLUSION
Although I was unable to draw a direct correlation between these two things, it is clear
that there is this potential correlation for those able to develop further research. In general, I
think the relationship between divorce and pensions is an important topic to develop further
research. Although there is research on economics and divorce, the research community should
look into more studies outside of the US, and studies focusing on the exact relationship of
divorce and pensions. Additionally, as seen in the history and reform section, the pensions
systems in Latin America can be a complicated system to study. It is ever changing, but this
change overtime of privatization has many effects, some of which we still do not see. It is clear
that both the PAYG-DB and FF-DC systems create gender gaps in pensions, and so how these
systems change over time, and what reforms are created to try and remedy these gaps are crucial
when trying to evaluate gender inequalities in Latin America. Lastly, I think that divorce trends
overall should be studied, and as seen in Latin America this general trend of increasing divorce
rates tells an important story, one in which I think has a lot to do with women’s empowerment,
and access to more opportunity. However, the lack of data currently out there on divorce
numbers and rates is surprising. I think that potentially there could be interesting research, on
this lack of data. Lastly, I believe that some of these political decisions, like privatization of
pensions, could potentially have a large effect on social decisions like divorce. Overall, I hope
that as seen in my research, that others going forward could establish some sort of correlation
and path the way for further research in this topic. Because in the scheme of development in
Latin America, it is important to think about how pension policy affects the population. As Latin
America moves towards being more developed countries and economies, they hopefully move to
be more equal societies as well, and this question of pensions and gender equality is an important
step towards this type of society.
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